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Abstract: The parallel drawn by Norman between the dorsal and ventral
systems and direct and indirect approaches is based on two misrepresen-
tations of the direct approach – that it is concerned only with the uncon-
scious control of action, and that it cannot explain learning. We propose a
way of understanding the visual system differences from within the direct
approach.
Norman has suggested that the functioning of the dorsal system
can be understood from a direct/ecological perspective and that
of the ventral system from an indirect/constructivist perspective.
We believe that this reconciliation falls short in two important re-
spects. First, it is our contention that no kind of perception is best
understood as indirect. In other words, perception via the ventral
system is as direct as that via the dorsal system. If this is true, then
the differences between the two visual systems must be a conse-
quence of something else. Our second point then, is that these dif-
ferences can be understood as a division of function within the di-
rect approach.
Norman suggests that direct theories successfully explain only
unconscious perception which guides manipulative action. We
disagree. Clearly, some information pickup (in the Gibsonian
sense) is unconscious, but this does not mean that all information
pickup is unconscious. For example, orienting towards and track-
ing a swooping bird, watching it land, and then trying to identify
what kind of bird it is as it sits behind swaying vegetation, are all
the kinds of things Gibson had in mind when he stressed the di-
rect and active nature of perception. This is a sequence of per-
ceptual acts which do not involve object manipulations and which
result in completely conscious percepts. In addition, constructivist
approaches invariably propose that we are only aware of some of
the representations we activate in a long sequence of processing
(the last ones in the chain, typically), so awareness is a dubious dis-
tinction between the approaches, in any case.
The other important misrepresentation of the direct approach
is the claim that information pickup is largely an unlearned
process. It must be noted that far from viewing learning as a pe-
ripheral aspect of perception, the direct theorist places learning at
the centre of any explanation of human behavior. For example,
whether or not a gap can be jumped over depends on how big the
jumper is, the strength of their legs, whether they are riding a bi-
cycle, and various other factors. Obviously, the perception of what
the gap affords must be learned, if only because that changes as
the perceiver grows.
In a footnote, Norman grants the dorsal system procedural
memory, but no “representational memory.” This is fine for the di-
rect theorist, but only because she considers all memories as pro-
cedural rather than representational (a position which echoes the
proceduralist stand of memory theorists, such as Crowder 1993).
The direct approach to learning is to suggest that it involves “tun-
ing in to” properties of the world – acquiring sensitivities to situ-
ations or relationships in the world. There are brain changes as-
sociated with these new sensitivities, but these changes don’t
“represent” the external situations, they merely give the perceiver
a new sensitivity. This is less liable to be misinterpreted if we use
a simpler, nonneural, example. Lifting lots of heavy weights causes
changes to muscular tissue. These changes give the weight-lifter
new abilities – they can now lift previously unliftable weights.
They stand in a new relationship to certain (heavy) objects in the
world (they have a new “sensitivity,” in one sense). Importantly,
there is no sense in which the changes in the musculature “en-
code” the events that lead to them. Note the similarity between
this example and the learning of connectionist models; changes in
muscle fibres and connection weights are, to our minds, the same
general kind of change. One hallmark of this view is that it is clear
what is happening when learning occurs, unlike the state of affairs
following the “encoding of a new representation.”
We are in general agreement with Milner and Goodale (1995)
(and, to some extent, with Norman) that the major difference be-
tween the ventral and dorsal visual pathways is one of function.
However, we state that functional distinction in slightly different
terms. According to Norman, the representation-less dorsal stream
is implicated in reaching behavior, whereas the ventral stream me-
diates object recognition through long-term representations. Pre-
sumably, this distinction is based on the belief that an object’s size
is a property of the object (which can therefore be detected di-
rectly), but its identity is a relational property (it is a member of
some class of objects). Of course, in order to grasp an object, its
size must be known relative to the observer, and so this is a rela-
tional property too, but it is a different kind of relationship. Since
both these kinds of relationships are properties of the world, a di-
rect theory has no problem proposing that the recognition and
grasping of objects are both a function of sensitivity to relational
properties. The dorsal stream appears to be sensitive to person-
relative properties of the world (egocentric relationships), and the
ventral stream appears to be sensitive to object-relative properties
of the world (allocentric relationships). For example, even if it
could be unequivocally shown that when a person reaches for a
disc embedded in an illusory context they do so accurately, but
when judgements are made of the disc using the ventral system
they are influenced by the illusion, this would be perfectly explic-
able from an entirely direct perspective. Such an explanation
would only need to propose that the dorsal system is sensitive to
the “absolute” diameter of the disc but the ventral system is only
sensitive to its relative diameter. It is sensitivity to relative size that
generates the illusion. In our view, understanding of the func-
tioning of the ventral stream will come from more careful consid-
eration of the allocentric relationships in the world to which hu-
man perceivers become sensitive. That understanding, however,
will be best considered in terms of the direct relationship between
the human perceiver and the world which is perceived.
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Abstract: The conceptual space (Gärdenfors 2000) is discussed as a rep-
resentation structure that connects the constructivist and the ecological vi-
sion subsystems in an operating autonomous robot based on computer vi-
sion.
The two vision subsystems discussed by Norman, based on the
constructivist and the ecological approaches, have an immediate
counterpart in the design of robotic architectures based on com-
puter vision. On the one side, the ecological approach is adopted
to design robot behaviors that reactively connect the information
acquired by cameras and other sensors to robot actions, as in the
case of obstacle avoidance, path following, and orienting the ro-
bot towards a goal (see Arkin 1998).
On the other side, the constructivist approach is adopted to de-
sign the object recognition system of the robot, that is, the high-
level vision algorithms that let the robot identify and recognize the
objects on which it needs to act in its working environment. In
general, a robot object recognition system generates 2D/3D ob-
server-independent reconstruction of the objects in the perceived
Commentary/Norman: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches
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